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investment expropriationin non-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) MENA countries and 
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Institutions are defined as the set of rules governing human behaviour (North 1991). 
They include both formal and informal rules. Formal rules are legal in nature, and 
include constitutions, laws, and regulations created and enforced by the government, 
in response to individuals’ needs to organize interactions in society. Informal rules are 
social in nature, and include traditions and customs, influenced by cultures and 
beliefs, and evolve with the development of society and human behaviour. 
Institutions play an important role in supporting markets and transactions by 
protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and facilitating collective action to 
provide physical and organizational infrastructure (Dixit 2009). They create order, 
reduce uncertainty in the exchange of goods and capital, and help determine the 
transaction and production costs and thus the feasibility and profitability of engaging 
in economic activity (North 1991). 
Among the positive outcomes of good institutions is the promotion of integration into 
the world economy (Rodrik 2008).In promoting integration into the world economy, 
capital flows constitute one important integration channel.Property rights protection 
(PRP)is widely believed and has been empirically found to encourage capital flows 
and provide incentives for investment and capital exchange.  
In empirically examining the influence of domestic institutions on capital flows, 
empirical studies have focused mostly on domestic PRP institutional 
functions.1,2These studies have used indicators of institutional functions quality, 
which assess actual performance against industrialized countries’ first 
bestperformance. 
This assessment approach has been adopted despite the diverging social and political 
norms between developing and emerging market economies on the one hand, and 
developed economies on the other. Such approach implies that institutional reforms, if 
decided on, should in principle bring convergence of domestic institutional functions 
performance in developing and emerging market economies to that in developed 
countries. It may also imply that in undertaking institutional reforms, developing and 
emerging market economies should adopt an ‘orthodox’ approach of reforming 
domestic institutions that is believed to achieve the first best, a point that is discussed 
further below. 
                                                 
1  By PRP institutional functions we refer to the outcomes of domestic institutions, mainly the legal 
and judicial systems and the government bureaucracy, which influence the PRP process. Examples 
of these functions are the issuance and the enforcement of laws, contracts and order; the restriction 
of government power to expropriate and extract rents; and the control of corruption. 
2  See for example Alfaro et al. (2008), Asiedu (2006), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Daude and 
Fratzscher (2008), Daude and Stein (2007), Du et al. (2008), Faria and Mauro (2009), Kraay and 
Nehru (2006), Lane (2004), Mina (2006), Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2006), Mishra and Dally 
(2007), Naude and Krugell (2007), and Wei (2000). 6 
 
The assessment of institutional function performance against industrialized countries’ 
first best is understandable in light of the intensifying globalization over the past 
quarter century and the growing importance of markets in resource allocation and 
conducting economic activity. Intensifying globalization and development of markets 
have required the adoption of common institutional functions and standards, similar to 
the adoption of a common language in communications, which facilitate trade and 
capital mobility. 
Adopting an orthodox approach for institutional reforms, however, does not take into 
account a country’s unique circumstance and the interaction with other institutional 
features within the country. This view is supported by Rodrik (2008), who argues that 
institutional reforms promoted, for example by the World Bank, IMF or WTO, 
presume the existence of a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements the 
convergence to which is ‘inherently desirable’. He also warns that the convergence to 
a firstbest practice does not‘consider potential interactions with institutional features 
elsewhere in the system’ and advocates institutional reforms based on the theory of 
the second best instead.3 
Along the lines of the theory of the second best, many governments have signed 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the presence of domestic institutional functions 
in order to strengthen PRP, either as complements or substitutes to their domestic 
(PRP) institutional functions. A BIT is a legal instrument under international law 
between two contracting countries, the aim of which is to establish clear, simple, and 
enforceable rules for the reciprocation of foreign investment protection from the risk 
of government expropriation in each other’s country. It identifies the circumstances 
under which expropriation can take place and the associated compensation standards, 
and establishes investment dispute settlement mechanisms, which facilitate foreign 
investment in the presence of imperfect domestic PRP institutional functions. 
Against the theoretical debate underlying institutional reforms, the paper empirically 
e x a m i n e s  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  d e b a t e  t o  M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  N o r t h  A f r i c a  ( M E N A )  
countries. Thepaper empirically examines the influence of the second best approach 
for PRP comprised of BITs and domestic institutional functions (as well as the 
interaction between them) on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the MENA 
region, while controlling for the traditional FDI determinants. The paper compares 
such influence to that of the first best approach comprised only of domestic 
institutional functions. MENA countries provide room for improvement in 
performance of a number of domestic institutional functions. The paper selects 
treaties entered into force with high-income OECD countries, constituting about 
one-third of the number of treaties entered into force by 11 high- and middle-income 
                                                 
3  Using Ghana and Vietnam as examples, Rodrik (2008) argues that despite the presence of 
commercial laws, courts are highly inefficient, costly to use, and potentially corruptible. In 
response, firms resort to relational contracting as an alternative, building long-term relationships 
with each other and sustaining cooperation through repeated interaction. Long-term relational 
contracting is regarded as a (better) informal substitute to the (weak) formal PRP institutions. 7 
 
MENA countries, which aim to attract FDI flows.4 MENA countries include both 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and non-GCC MENA countries. 
The paper uses panel data for the period 1991–2007 and adopts feasible generalized 
least squares methodology to account for heterogeneity. Autocorrelation, both within 
and across panels, is accounted for. Empirical evidence suggests no influence of 
domestic institutional functions in most model specifications. However, in the case of 
non-GCC MENA countries, an improvement in the risk of investment expropriation 
has a positive influence on FDI flows.The influence of BITs alone is hardly 
significant in economic and statistical size in non-GCC countries, but significant in 
GCC countries. The joint influence of domestic institutional functions and BITs, as 
well as the interaction between them is positive in specifications containing 
investment expropriation risk and government stability in non-GCC MENA countries, 
and corruption in the case of GCC countries. 
Empirical evidence also shows that location factors are important determinants of FDI 
flows to MENA countries. In GCC countries oil prices and labour force attract   
FDI flows, while oil production and inflation discourage them. Trade openness on the 
other hand has a positive though statistically insignificant influence. In non-GCC 
countries labour force and trade openness play a positive and statistically significant 
role in attracting FDI flows. Similar to GCC countries, oil production has a negative 
but marginally significant influence, while oil price has no statistically significant 
influence unlike in GCC countries. 
The paper contributes to the development economics, international capital flows, and 
economic policy literature(s) in three main respects. First, it revisits the 
conceptualization of and policy debate on institutional reform approaches in   
the development economics and economic policy literature, and empirically examines 
it in international capital flows context for the first time in the literature. Second, it 
regards PRP as a multidimensional process, which involves a set of inter-related 
domestic institutional functions serving this purpose. Third, stemming from an 
institutional reform perspective, the paper focuses on a group of MENA countries and 
decomposes them into natural resource-rich GCC countries and human resource-rich 
non-GCC MENA countries. Each of these two groups of countries has common 
characteristics. This approach adds depth to our understanding of regional policy 
reforms. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the findings of the empirical 
literature on the influence of domestic institutional functions on capital flows, the 
influence of BITs on FDI, in addition to the determinants of FDI in the MENA 
region.Section 3 discusses the proliferation of BITs, and the performance of domestic 
institutional functions and FDI in the MENA region. Section 4discusses the empirical 
                                                 
4  Sample countries comprise Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia from North Africa, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE from the GCC region, in addition to Jordan and Syria. 
Lebanon has been excluded from the sample due to the civil war and political unrest, which have 
plagued the country until recently, and the absence of natural resources, an important explanatory 
variable in the empirical model. Libya and Qatar have been excluded due to missing observations 
on trade openness, as discussed further in Section 5. 8 
 
model and the testable hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the data and empirical issues 
and the estimation methodology adopted. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the empirical 
results and robustness checks, respectively, while Section 8 concludes. 
 
2  Empirical literature survey 
In this section we discuss three strands of the empirical literature. The first strand is 
on the influence of domestic institutional functions on capital flows. The second 
strand is on the influence of BITs on FDI. While the first two sub-sections report the 
findings of the literature, the third strand is MENA region-specific and discusses the 
determinants of FDI in the region.5 
2.1  Domestic institutional functions and capital flows 
The influence of domestic institutional functions on the different types of capital 
flows has been empirically examined in the capital flows literature. In the FDI 
literatureit is found that better domestic institutional functions encourage FDI in 
different regions. Asiedu (2006) finds that less corruption, political stability, and legal 
system reliability promote FDI in Africa, a result that Naudé and Krugell (2007) 
share. Mishra and Daly (2007) reach similar results in examining FDI in host 
OECDand Asian countries. They find that the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, popular observance of law, strength and quality of bureaucracy, and 
government stability have a direct effect on FDI. Focusing on US FDI in China, Du et 
al. (2008) recently examine the impact of economic institutions, including PRP and 
contract enforcement, on location choice among Chinese regions, and find that US 
multinationals prefer to invest in regions with better protection of intellectual property 
rights, lower degree of government intervention in business operations, lower level of 
government corruption, and better contract enforcement. 
More generally in developing countries,Busse and Hefeker (2007) find that 
institutional functions, namely government stability, internal and external conflict, 
corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of 
government, and quality of bureaucracy, are highly significant determinants of FDI 
inflows.Daude and Stein (2007) find that better institutional functions have an overall 
positive effect on bilateral FDI. However, some institutional functions have more 
influence on FDI than others; these include government stability, law predictability, 
and quality of regulations and policies. Wei (2000) focuses solely on corruption and 
finds that corruption acts as a tax deterrent to bilateral FDI. 
PRP institutional functions have an important influence on equity capital flows, i.e. 
both FDI and portfolio equity. In examining whether countries get more financially 
integrated through certain types of capital flows as opposed to others, Daude and 
                                                 
5  There is another strand of the limited FDI literature on the MENA region which addresses its 
influence on growth (Kandil and Mirzaie 2009;Korgstup and Matter 2005; Omran and 
Bolbol2003;Sadik and Bolbol2001). This strand, however, is beyond the scope of the paper. 9 
 
Fratzscher (2008) find that portfolio investment, compared to FDI and debt securities, 
is by far the most sensitive to quality of institutional functions. Similarly Alfaro et al. 
(2008) find that low institutional quality is the leading factor in explaining the lack of 
capital flows from rich to poor countries—the Lucas Paradox. Exploring the 
determinants of countries’ external capital structure, Faria and Mauro (2009) find that 
the share of FDI and portfolio equity in countries’ total external liabilities is positively 
influenced by quality of institutional functions, as well as educational attainment and 
natural resource abundance—better domestic institutional functions are said to tilt 
countries’ capital structures towards equity and away from debt.  
In the international debt literature, it has been found that better PRP institutional 
function increases the level and lengthens the maturity of international lending, and 
reduces the probability of financial crisis. Kraay and Nehru (2006) find that 
improvement in policies and quality of institutional functions largely reduces the 
probability of debt distress, and is roughly of the same order of magnitude as 
reductions in debt burdens.6 Lane (2004) finds that better institutional function quality 
increases the level of external debt.7 Mina (2006) and Mina and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2006) show that better contract enforcement and institutional stability increase the 
level and lengthen the maturity of international lending a country can attract. 
In summary there appears to be four main findings of the above empirical studies. 
First, the quality of domestic institutional functions positively influences capital 
flows. Second, better institutional function quality tilts countries capital structure 
towards equity and away from debt. Third, portfolio equity is more sensitive to 
institutional function quality than FDI. Fourth, from a geographical perspective the 
influence of domestic institutional functions on FDI has been examined in different 
regions with the exception of the MENA region. 
The first and fourth findings are of special importance and relevance to this paper. 
The first finding lends major support to the first-best approach to institutional reforms 
typically called for by international organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF. 
The fourth finding clearly identifies a geographical gap in literature coverage, which 
this paper attempts to fill. 
2.2  BITs and FDI 
The influence of BITs on FDI has been examined in the FDI literature (Desbordes and 
Vicard 2009; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Egger and Merlo 2007; Hallward and 
Driemeier 2003; Kerner 2009; Mina 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005; Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman 2006; UNCTAD 1998). This research question has been extended to 
                                                 
6  They measure quality of policies and institutional functions using the World Bank’s country policy 
and institutional assessment. 
7  His measure of institutional quality is an average of government anti-diversionary practices index 
and the Sachs-Warner liberal policies index. The government anti-diversionary practices index is a 
weighted average ofthe International Country Risk Guide’s law and order, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts. The Sachs and Warner 
index measures the fraction of years (from 1950-94) that a country followed mainly liberal trade 
policies. 10 
 
a number of directions: the role of treaties in strengthening economic and political 
relationships (Desbordes and Vicard 2009); the nature of relationship between treaties 
and domestic institutions (being complements or substitutes) (Desbordes and Vicard 
2009; Hallward and Driemeier 2003; Mina 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005); the 
level of government commitment to PRP by signing or entering into force treaties 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Egger and Merlo 2007; Kerner 2009; Mina 2009); the 
impact of treaties on FDI over time (Egger and Merlo 2007); and the impact of 
treaties as proliferation across countries (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006). We 
briefly survey below these studies keeping in mind first the impact on FDI and second 
the finer strand addressed.We leave for the footnotes the empirical model and 
estimation methodology adopted. 
UNCTAD (1998) examines the impact of investment treaties on FDI using both time 
series and cross-section analyses. Time series analysis has been conducted using data 
over 11 years and 200 BITs signed between 14 home and 72 host countries. The study 
finds that investment treaties have a positive, albeit not a strong effect on FDI flows. 
However, BIT impact is most statistically significant for the share of a home country 
partner in a host country’s total inflows, and for the share of a particular host country 
in a home country’s total FDI outflows. The cross-section analysis of the study has 
found a positive impact of investment treaties on the absolute level of FDI flows and 
on FDI flows relative to GDP. The overall conclusion of the cross-section analysis is 
that investment treaties play a minor and secondary role in attracting FDI, while the 
leading determinant appears to be market size. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) in examining the 
impact of ratified BITs on bilateral FDI flows from 20 home OECD countries to 31 
host developing countries over the period 1980–2000.8 She tests for the change over 
time in the property rights introduced with ratified BITs in three ways: (a) using a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 once a BIT has been ratified between a pair 
of source-host countries (the significance of the coefficient indicates the importance 
of the treaty), (b) using a dummy variable for a three-year post-ratification window to 
capture the time horizon over which a BIT might attract additional FDI, and (c) using 
a series of dummies for the year of ratification, and each year prior and post-
ratification to see if there are consistent patterns across country pairs. She finds both 
negative and little positive impact of investment treaties on FDI in countries, and 
argues that this impact is possibly obscured by other changes occurring between the 
two contracting partners over time, such as lowering trade barriers, the increased 
knowledge of conducting business in the host country, and ratification of a tax treaty. 
She also finds that BITs complement rather than substitute for strong domestic 
                                                 
8  The dependent variables of the different empirical model specifications are FDI flows, FDI flows 
relative to GDP, and the share of home country FDI flows in total host country flows. The 
explanatory variables in the empirical model include (a) BITs ratification date, (b) the size of the 
source and host countries, (c) the host country’s GDP per capita, (d) inflation rate as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability, (d) trade relative to GDP as a measure of trade openness, (e) the gap in 
average years of education between the source and host pairs, and (f) two dummies to capture the 
effects of the enormous political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union and the ratification of NAFTA. Fixed effects and instrumental variables methodologies are 
adopted in econometric estimation.  11 
 
institutions, and are more ‘effective in settings of higher institutional quality and 
where institutions are already being strengthened.’ Accordingly, she argues that 
This undermines a central rational for some of the less developed 
countries that enter into these agreements hoping to bypass the need to 
strengthen property rights and institutions more generally. Put 
differently, if host countries are committed to trying to attract more 
FDI, BITs have not provided a short-cut from the need to implement 
broader reforms of domestic institutions (ibid.: 21–2). 
More recent studies have found a positive impact of BITs on FDI. Distinguishing 
between signed and ratified BITs, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) find that both signed 
and ratified treaties exert a significant positive impact on the stock of outward FDI of 
19 home OECD countries into 54 host countries (both OECD and non-OECD) for the 
period 1982–97.9However, the impact of ratified treaties is higher than that of signed 
treaties. Similarly Neumayer and Spess (2005) find that BITs have a significant 
positive impact on FDI flows to 119 developing countries for a longer time period 
(1970–2001).10 Also Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006), in studying the impact of 
BITs contracted between home OECD countries and host developing countries during 
the period 1980–2003, find that the number of treaties contracted has a positive 
impact on FDI in subsequent periods but their marginal impact diminishes as the 
number of globally contracted BITs increases. Additionally, they find that a stronger 
political environment for investment and a better local economic environment are 
complements to BITs. 
Accounting for the long-run dynamic effect of BITs on FDI and adopting a first-
differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator,Egger and Merlo 
(2007) use bilateral FDI stocks covering 24 home and 28 host OECD and transition 
countries in the period 1980–2001.11 They find that the long-run impact of BITs on 
FDI is nearly double the short-run effect. 
                                                 
9  The dependent variable in their study is outward FDI stocks in constant 1995US$. The explanatory 
variables are (a) absolute bilateral country size (sum of GDP in home and host countries), (b) 
similarity in bilateral country size, (c) bilateral difference in the endowment ratio of the skilled to 
unskilled labour (relative factor endowments), (d)BITs signed, (e)BITs ratified, (f) an interaction 
term between relative factor endowments and distance, (g) an interaction term between relative 
factor endowments and the difference in bilateral country size, and (h) an interaction term between 
relative factor endowments and absolute bilateral country size. They use a fixed effects model in 
their estimation. 
10 The dependent variable in their study is FDI flows in constant 1996 US$. The explanatory variables 
are (a) the number of BITs a developing country has signed with OECD countries weighted by the 
share of outward FDI flow the OECD country accounts for relative to total world outward FDI 
flows, (b) per capita income (in log form), (c) population size (in log form), economic growth rate, 
(e) WTO membership, (f) number of bilateral trade agreements concluded with the US, EC/EU, or 
Japan, (g) inflation rate, and (h) measures of institutional quality, which include Henisz’s (2000) 
political constraints and the International Country Risk Guide’s investment profile, government 
stability, law and order, and the composite political risk indices.  
11 The dependent variable is the bilateral outward FDI stocks (in log form). The explanatory variables 
are (a) the first lag of the dependent variable, (b) a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 starting 12 
 
Focusing on the oil abundant GCC countries and arguing that the rationale for 
contracting BITs seems controversial and goes beyond attracting FDI to strengthening 
bilateral economic and political relationships, Mina (2009) finds that BITs contracted 
with high-income non-OECD countries have a positive influence and are more 
influential on FDI stocks than domestic institutions, contrary to Hallward-Driemeier 
(2003).12On the other hand, BITs contracted with OECD and upper/middle-income 
countries have a surprisingly negative influence, and seem to be dominated by the 
significantly positive influence of domestic institutions on FDI similar to Hallward-
Driemeier (2003). 
Focusing on the political rationale of BITs, Desbordes and Vicard (2009) argue that 
foreign investors are likely sensitive to the quality of interstate political relationships, 
which negatively affects government expropriation of investment. In this respect BITs 
offset interstate political tensions. Using a gravity FDI model to empirically examine 
the impact of BITs on bilateral FDI stocks between 30 OECD countries and 62 OECD 
and non-OECD countries in 1991–2000, they find that the quality of interstate 
political relations significantly increases FDI, BITs have a positive effect on FDI 
stocks especially when interstate political relationships are tense, and the 
effectiveness of treaties increases with the quality of domestic governance suggesting 
that both domestic institutions and BITs are complements.13 
Observing the puzzle that BITs increase aggregateFDI flows despite the absence of 
evidence on increased investment by protected investors, Kerner (2009) offers 
explanations of the mechanisms through which BITs impact FDI based on 
international relations theories. He argues that ratified treaties can tie the 
government’s hands through ex post costs of violating treaties or send a signal that the 
                                                                                                                                          
the year a BIT is ratified among two countries, (c) the sum of GDP in host and home countries (in 
log form), (d) the relative size of GDP in home to host country (in log form), (e) the relative tertiary 
school enrollment shares of home to host country (in log form), and (f) a time trend. They adopt a 
first-differenced GMM estimator. 
12 The dependent variable is the stock of real FDI relative to GDP, while the explanatory variables are 
(a) the total number of BITs contracted, (b) domestic institutions measured by the International 
Country Risk Guide’s political risk index, (c) relative oil production, (d) market size measured by 
real GDP, (e) the general price level measured by the GDP deflator, (f) human capital proxied by 
secondary education enrollment relative to total school enrollment, and (g) trade openness 
measured by merchandise imports.She uses panel data for the period 1984-2002 and instrumental 
variables estimation methodology to deal with endogeneity associated with reverse causal 
relationship between FDI on the one side, and external commitment mechanisms and domestic 
institutions on the other. 
13 The dependent variable of the empirical model is bilateral FDI stock, while the explanatory 
variables are (a) GDP in the home country, (b) GDP in the host country, (c) GDP per capita in the 
home country, (d) GDP per capita in the host country, (e) bilateral distance, (f) gravity-specific 
dummies (contiguity and common language), (g) measure of the quality of domestic institutions in 
the host country, (h) proxy of the quality of interstate political relations, (i) a dummy for BITs, (j) 
an interaction term between BITs and the quality of domestic institutions in the host country, and 
(k) an interaction terms between BITs and interstate political relationships between the home and 
host countries. Poisson quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) is used to deal with the 
problem of accounting for zeros in the dependent variable which is common to log specifications of 
gravity models. QMLE is also consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 13 
 
government observes investors’ property rights and is therefore trustworthy.14He tests 
two main hypotheses. First, BITs tie governments’ hands and therefore encourage 
FDI flows from protected investors. Second, BITs send widely a credible PRP signal, 
and therefore encourage FDI flows from both protected and unprotected investors by 
the treaty. 
In summary three main useful messages arise from these empirical studies. First, the 
influence of BITs depends on the degree of government commitment to PRP, and is 
surprisingly not always positive. Second, domestic institutional functions can 
complement or substitute BITs in attracting FDI. Third, the impact of BITs tends to 
diminish as the number of treaties contracted globally increases. None of these studies 
however has taken a developmental perspective at BITs vis-á-vis domestic 
institutional functions, and raised the question of how can policy makers improve 
PRP. Should countries reform domestic institutional functions independently of 
contracting BITs—a first best approach? Or should countries rather pursue 
institutional reforms by having both of them jointly—a second best approach? These 
two policy questions motivate and underlie the hypotheses examined in this paper. 
2.3  FDI determinants in MENA region 
The literature on FDI determinants in the MENA region is fairly recent and limited. 
Explaining the stagnating FDI flows (relative to GDP) to the MENA region between 
1985 and 1999, Chanand Gemayel (2004) focus on investment risk. They find that 
investment risk instability has been a key determinant in discouraging FDI into the 
region; investment risk stability increases the rate of return certainty, and becomes 
more desirable as investment risk increases.15 In the European Union and North 
America, investment risk, as opposed to investment risk instability, explain FDI 
inflows.  
Going beyond investment risk to market fundamentals,Onyeiwu (2003) examines 
whether the determinants of FDI flows affect the MENA region differently from other 
developing countries. Using data on 51 developing countries including 10 MENA 
countries for the period 1975–99, he finds that trade openness and privatization 
increase FDI flows to MENA, while corruption and bureaucratic red tape reduce 
                                                 
14 Elkins et al. (2006) perceive BITs tying the hands of the government by (a) specifying the 
contractual obligations of the host government regarding the protection of foreign investments,(b) 
explicitly involving the home country’s government thereby increasing the possibility of severing 
diplomatic relations as the foreign investor’s home government gets involved in case of investment 
disputes,(c) enhancing contract enforcement and awarding compensation to foreign investors 
whenever expropriation is established through the dispute settlement body, and (d) increasing the 
reputation costs in the eyes of other non-treaty countries and investors. 
15 The dependent variable is the ratio of FDI flows to GDP, while the explanatory variables are (a) 
lagged dependent variable, (b) the mean of FDI to GDP ratio during the period, (c) risk index. They 
use three types of risks separately: economic, financial, and political, and examine the influence of 
the level, standard deviation, and interquartile range of the risk index. They used data on 19 MENA 
countries for the period 1990-99 and random effects dynamic model in estimation. 14 
 
flows to the region. Traditional FDI determinants, such as the rate of return on 
investment, infrastructures, economic growth, and inflation, have no effect.16 
Earlier Kamaly (2000) examines the factors influencing FDI flows to the MENA 
region using data on 11 countries—Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait,Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen—for the period 1990–99. He finds that 
FDI is highly persistent, and that real GDP growth rate has a positive influence on 
FDI in both the short- and long-run.17 He also introduces other explanatory variables 
into the regression model—the rate of change and variability of the nominal exchange 
rate, democracy,the ratio of M2 to GDP as a measure of financial deepening, and 
creditworthiness variables.18 However,none of the coefficients of these variables are 
statistically significant. 
Also focusing on fundamentals was Hisarciklilar et al. (2006) who examine the 
influence of market potential on the stock of FDI in 18 MENA countries over the 
period 1980–2001.19 Market potential includes both domestic and foreign 
markets.They find that domestic market size and intra-MENA region trade 
opportunities have a positive influence on the stock of inward FDI, and conclude that 
FDI in the MENA region is market-as opposed to resource-seeking. 
                                                 
16 The dependent variable is net FDI as a percentage of GDP, while the explanatory variables are (a) 
the rate of return on investment measured by the log of the inverse of the real GDP per capita, (b) 
openness of the economy measured by the sum of imports and exports relative GDP, (c) political 
rights measured by Freedom House’s Index of Political Freedom, (d) infrastructureproxied by the 
number of telephone lines per 1,000 people, (e) natural resource availability measured by the ratio 
of fuel exports to total exports, f) corruption and bureaucratic red tape proxied by government 
expenditure relative to GDP, (g) human capital measured by secondary school enrollment relative 
to the population in secondary school age, (h) and macroeconomic fundamentals, which include (i) 
real GDP growth rate, (ii) inflation (proxied by the rate of change of the consumer price index), (iii) 
tax rate (measured by the corporate profit tax rate), and (iv) external debt (measured by total 
external debt as a percentage of GDP).He adopts a panel data fixed effects model to control for 
country and timeeffects. 
17 The dependent variable is the ratio of FDI to GDP, while the explanatory variables are (a) the 
lagged dependent variable, (b) the lagged real GDP growth, (c) the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP as a proxy of trade openness, and (d) the weighted average bond yield in the G7 countries to 
account for external push factors. He usesa dynamic panel model of FDI flows and system GMM 
estimation methodology. 
18 Creditworthiness variables are the ratios of long-term debt to GDP, total debt to GDP, and the 
difference between total debt and international reserves to GDP. 
19 The dependent variable in this model is the stock of inward FDI in the host MENA country, while 
the explanatory variables include (a) real GDP, (b) size of population, (c) exports relative to GDP, 
(d) imports relative to GDP, and (e) telephone mainlines. Variables are expressed in log form. Real 
GDP and population size are proxies for purchasing power and market size, respectively. Exports 
and imports reflect trade potential and are broken down by region into MENA, European Union, 
and rest of the world. Telephone mainlines are used to proxy for infrastructure. The 18 countries 
included in the sample are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen. They estimate a spatial error autocorrelation model with both fixed spatial and time effects, 
and also accounting for third country characteristics (impact of characteristics of nearby countries 
on FDI in host country)using a maximum likelihood estimation technique. 15 
 
FDI in natural resource-rich MENA countries has also attracted attention. Mina 
(2007) studies the location determinants of FDI flows to the GCC countries during the 
period 1980–2002, along Dunning’s (1981) ownership-location-internalization (OLI) 
paradigm.20 Estimates show that oil production, oil reserves, and oil prices have a 
surprisingly negative influence on FDI flows, contrary to expectations about positive 
association between oil resources and FDI.However, when expressing oil production 
relative to oil reserves, the influence becomes positive. Estimates also show that while 
institutional quality, trade openness, and infrastructure development have encouraged 
FDI flows, human capital has significantly discouraged them. 
The findings of the MENA FDI determinants literature reveal two main points. First, 
for GCC countries natural resources and human capital discourage FDI flows, while 
institutional quality, trade openness, and infrastructure development encourage them. 
Second, more generally in MENA countries from market fundamentals perspective 
market potential encourage FDI, while evidence on economic growth is inconclusive. 
From institutions perspective, the level and stability of institutional quality positively 
influence FDI. Accordingly, what is common among these studies is that trade and 
institutional quality encourage FDI in the MENA region, a point we keep in mind in 
this research. 
3  MENA domestic institutional function and investment treaties experience 
3.1  Domestic institutional function performance 
In assessing the performance of domestic institutional functions, we compare the PRP 
and political functions performance of the sample MENA countries to that of (24) 
OECD countries using International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) political risk 
components.21 The period under investigation is 1990–2008 in which BITs contracted 
by MENA countries proliferated. Table 1 shows the MENA countries average 
performance with respect to the risk of investment expropriation (labelled ‘investment 
profile’) and law and order is not far away from OECD average performance, contrary 
to common perceptions. Average MENA countries performance on risk of investment 
expropriation amounted to about 87 per cent while law and order amounted to 77 per 
cent. The performance on corruption and bureaucracy quality was poor, however, 
reaching about 55 and 52 per cent of OECD average, respectively. 
                                                 
20 The dependent variable is net FDI inflows relative to GDP, while the explanatory variables are: (a) 
oil resources, (b) oil price, (c) market size measured by real GDP , (d) human capital proxied by 
secondary school enrollment relative to total school enrollment, (e) trade openness measured by the 
sum of merchandise exports and imports relative to GDP, (f) infrastructure development measured 
by the sum of telephone mainlines and cellular mobile phones per 1,000 people, and (g) 
institutional quality proxied by the rule of law indicator. Oil resources are measured using three 
different approaches: (a) reserves, (b) production, and (c) oil production relative to reserves. All 
variables are in log forms. He uses fixed/random effectspanel data models. 
21 A higher score indicates a lower risk. More information on the political risk components is 
provided in section 4 below. 16 
 
Within the MENA countries, the GCC countries scored higher than non-GCC 
countries. The average performance of GCC countries on investment expropriation 
risk, law and order, and bureaucracy quality was nearly 20 per cent higher than that 
for non-GCC countries, but about 13 per cent lower on corruption. 
As far as political institutional functions are concerned, the average performance fared 
better than PRP average. Government stability was better in the MENA region than in 
the OECD countries and outperformed it by 12 per cent. Performance on ethnic 
tensions, external, and internal conflict amounted to 93 per cent, 90 per cent, and 86 
per cent, respectively. The worst performance, however, was on democratic 
accountability accounting for about 40 per cent of OECD average. Within the MENA 
region, the GCC countries performed on average better than non-GCC countries 
except for democratic accountability. 
Individual country performance is provided in Table 2. Oman had the highest average 
score on investment expropriation risk, Jordan on corruption and democratic 
accountability, Bahrain on law and order, and on bureaucracy quality with the UAE, 
Morocco and Syria on government stability, Qatar on ethnic tensions, Tunisia on 
internal conflicts and religion in politics, Algeria on external conflicts, and the UAE 
on bureaucracy quality together with Bahrain on military in politics. 
What these statistics suggest is that based on investment expropriation risk alone there 
might not be enough justification for MENA countries to sign BITs, however. There 
are other institutional functions, both PRP and political, that may have been 
associated with contracting BITs and therefore should be considered when assessing 
institutional reforms. 
3.2  BITs entered into force 
The MENA countries have entered into force 300 treaties in total, as Table 3 shows, 
one third of which are with high-income OECD countries.22 Egypt entered into force 
the largest number of treaties (64), followed by Morocco (35), and Kuwait (33). 
Excluding Libya which has been embargoed internationally until the first half of the 
2000s, Saudi Arabia accounted for the least number of treaties. Morocco ratified the 
largest number of treaties with OECD countries (13) followed by Egypt (12), and 
Tunisia (11). 
3.3  Association between FDI inflows, domestic institutional functions, and BITs 
Table 4 shows average FDI flows to MENA countries in the period 1985–2008. 
Among the non-GCC countries, Egypt attracted the highest level on average 
amounting to US$2.3 billion, while Syria attracted the least (US$0.3 billion). Among 
the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE attracted the highest levels amounting 
on average to US$4 billion and US$3 billion, respectively, followed by Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. 
                                                 
22 The income classification of BITs is discussed in Section 5 below. 17 
 
The correlation between FDI inflows, domestic PRP institutional functions, and BITs 
for all MENA countries and for the GCC and non-GCC countries separately is 
provided in Table 5. FDI inflows are mostly correlated with investment expropriation 
risk on the PRP side and government stability on the political side. An improvement 
in expropriation risk is positively associated with FDI inflows to the MENA 
countries.  
Among the different income classifications of BITs, FDI inflows are mostly 
associated with those entered into force with high-income OECD countries in the 
sample countries. However, the country breakdown shows that this association is 
significant only in the non-GCC countries. In addition OECD treaties have mostly 
been associated with investment expropriation risk and government stability in non-
GCC countries and government stability and investment expropriation risk in GCC 
countries, as Table 6 shows. 
4  Empirical model and hypotheses 
4.1 Empirical  model 
Gravity models have been increasingly used in empirical studies to explore bilateral 
FDI flows, such as Bellacket al. (2008), Bevan and Estrin (2004), Desbordes and 
Vicard (2009), Frenkel et al. (2004), Hallward-Driemeier (2003), and Wei (2000). 
However, in the absence of bilateral FDI flows data on MENA countries, adoption of 
a typical gravity model becomes infeasible. 
We should note, however, that gravity models in essence constitute an extension of 
the location advantage hypothesis of Dunning’s (1981) OLI paradigm. The location 
advantage hypothesis argues that for a multinational corporation to invest abroad 
location advantages have to exist in the host market. These advantages include natural 
and human resource endowments, market size, level of economic development, 
degree of openness of the economy, conducive economic policies, and PRP. 
Of the many location advantages that characterize the MENA region, natural and 
human resource endowments stand out. In the MENA region, natural resource 
endowments include both oil (O) and natural gas reserves (G), which attract resource-
seeking FDI. Resource-rich MENA countries in the sample include Algeria (O/G), 
Egypt (G), Kuwait (O/G), Libya (O/G), Qatar (O/G), Saudi Arabia (O), and UAE 
(O/G).23 Table 7 shows oil and natural gas reserves in the MENA region. Some 
MENA countries are labour abundant, such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Syria. 
The empirical model expresses FDI flows as: 
ln(FDIFLOWSit) = β0 + β1ln(FDIFLOWSit-1)+β2ln(INSTITFNit) + β3BITit  
+ β4BITINSTITFNit + β5ln(OILit) + β6ln(PRICEit)+β7ln(LABOURit)  
                                                 
23 Libya and Qatar are later dropped from the sample due to missing observations, as discussed in the 
section.  18 
 
+ β8ln(TRADEit) + β9ln(INFLATIONit) + β10ln(WFDIFLOWSit) + εit 
     (1) 
where  FDIFLOWS is annual FDI inflows, FDIFLOWSit-1  lagged dependent 
variable,INSTITFN domestic PRP institutional function, BITbilateral investment 
treaty entered into force,BITINSTITFNisan interaction term between the natural 
logarithm of domestic PRP institutional function on the one hand and BITs on the 
other,24OIL oil production, PRICE oil price, LABOUR labour force, TRADE trade, 
INFLATIONinflation rate, WFDIFLOWS world FDI flows, and ε an error term.25 The 
subscripts i and t are country and time indicators with i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T. In the 
panel dataset used, N=11and T=17 for the period 1991–2007.Appendix A provides 
more information on variables. 
We use annual FDI flows rather than FDI stocks to examine PRP influence, through 
domestic institutional functions and BITs, on changes in FDI stock. Also we use the 
level of FDI flows as opposed to the ratio of FDI flows to GDP in order to capture the 
change in FDI stocks directly and not their relative weight to the host country.26 We 
normalize FDI flows by population size to account for differences in size of 
economies as a robustness exercise, as discussed in Section 8.  
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the empirical model serves two 
purposes. First, it accounts for the persistence in FDI flows, especially when these 
flows are related to natural resources. Natural resources require flows of foreign 
investment over time. Second, it mitigates the likely upward bias in the influence of 
BITs and domestic PRP institutional functions on FDI flows. This bias likely results 
from the lack of bilateral FDI data and the consequent modelling of BITs as BITs as 
further discussed in the next section. We expect the variable coefficient to be positive. 
BIT is the total (cumulative) number of BITsentered into force. We use BITs entered 
into force as opposed to signed treaties to account for actual commitment to PRP by 
contracting MENA countries. Treaties are expected to reduce political risk and 
strengthen PRP, and encourage FDI inflows. Therefore the coefficient of BIT is 
expected to be positive. 
INSTITFN is domestic PRP institutional function. Because PRP is a multidimensional 
process, we model PRP using four ICRG political risk components: investment 
profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. These four functions are 
outcomes of the legal and judicial systems and government bureaucracy, and are 
essential to PRP.Investment profile refers to the risk of investment expropriation, 
profits repatriation, and payment delays, clearly influencing PRP. Corruption is a 
                                                 
24 This term is introduced to model policy interaction between domestic institutional functions and 
BITs. It is constructed as ln(INSTITFNit)*BITit. 
25 We should note that because of a high correlation coefficient between oil production and domestic 
market size, as measured by nominal and real GDP, of about 0.9 for the sample countries we 
decided to omit the latter. For GCC and non-GCC countries this coefficient is about 0.9 and 0.5, 
respectively.  
26 This is similar to Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005). 19 
 
threat to PRP as it enables people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, constituting a threat to the rights of foreign investors as they 
facilitate government expropriation of investment or when direct conflicts with those 
patrons arise. Law and order refers to the strength and impartiality of the legal system 
as well as the popular observance of the law. Quality of bureaucracy refers to 
bureaucracy governing without drastic changes in policy when governments change. 
Higher scores on these political risk indices indicate better performance. A positive 
coefficient for each of these functions is expected. 
In addition to the four PRP institutional functions, we also add government stability, a 
political institutional function, based on the correlation between FDI, the different 
domestic institutional coefficients, and BITs of Tables 4 and 5. Government stability 
refers to the ability of the government to carry out its declared programme(s) and stay 
in office. A positive coefficient of government stability is also expected. 
BITINSTITFN is an interaction term between domestic institutional functions and 
BITs. This term is included to allow for the interplay between domestic PRP 
institutional functions and BITs. A positive coefficient indicates that institutional 
functions and treaties complement each other, while a negative coefficient indicates if 
they are rather substitutes. 
OIL and PRICE are oil production and prices, respectively.27 Because oil production 
requires capital and technology, we expect the OIL coefficient to be positive. 
Similarly higher oil prices encourage the supply of oil, up to a limit in OPEC 
countries at least, and thus we expect a positive PRICE coefficient similarly. 
LABOUR is included to account for human resource endowments in MENA countries. 
Some measure of labour productivity or unit labour cost would be ideal if we need to 
reflect the wage differentials between home and host countries.28 Alternatively some 
measure of education, such as the share of secondary school enrolment in total school 
enrolment, would be ideal to account for human capital. However data on labour 
productivity measures and on secondary school enrolment are largely missing.29 We 
would expect a positive LABOUR coefficient. 
TRADE is a measure of the degree of openness of the economy. An open economy is 
conducive for FDI flows, and therefore we expect a positive coefficient. INFLATION 
is a proxy for macroeconomic stability in the economy. A higher inflation rate is an 
indicator of lower macroeconomic stability and real incomes, and therefore 
discourages FDI flows. A negative coefficient is expected. 
                                                 
27  See footnote 26 on the correlation between oil production and domestic market size. 
28 Bellaket al. (2008) in examining the influence of labour costs on FDI flows to Central and Eastern 
European countries use unit labour costs and labour productivity. 
29 World Development Indicators data on secondary school enrollment are unavailable from 2002 or 
2003 onwards for the sample countries.  20 
 
WFDIFLOWSis included to take into account the business cycle in the global 
economy. MENA countries are likely to obtain more FDI flows with expansion of the 
world economy and global FDI flows. A positive coefficient is expected. 
4.2 Testable  hypotheses 
We use the above empirical model provided by equation (1) to test whether the 
second best approach to PRP institutional reform, as opposed to the first best 
approach, has a positive influence on FDI flows to the MENA countries. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the first best comprises domestic institutional functions 
only, whereas the second best comprises both domestic institutional functions and 
BITs. 
First hypothesis:domestic PRP institutional functions have a positive influence of 
FDI flows to MENA countries. 
H0: β2 = 0 
H1: β2> 0 
Second hypothesis:domestic PRP institutional functions and BITs have a positive 
influence of FDI flows to MENA countries. 
H0: β2 = 0; β3 = 0 
H1: β2> 0; β3> 0 
5  Data and empirical issues and estimation methodology 
5.1 Data  issues 
FDI data on MENA countries are obtained from UNCTAD’s FDI online database. 
Because of the fluctuation of FDI flows as reflected in the standard deviation and the 
range of values shown in Table 8, we use natural logarithm. To get around zeros and 
negative value, we use the same approach adopted by Blonigen and Davies (2004) 
and Neumayer and Spess (2005).30 If the value of FDI flows is zero, we add one 
dollar and take the natural logarithm, resulting in a value of zero; otherwise we would 
have obtained no value as the log of zero does not exist. If the value of FDI flows is 
negative, we take the negative of the natural logarithm of the absolute value of FDI 
flows. The same approach is used with INSTITFN and OIL. 
Data on BITs are also obtained from UNCTAD’s FDI online database. We classified 
contracting partner countries for each of the 11 MENA countries into high-income 
OECD, high-income non-OECD, upper middle-income, lower middle-income, and 
low-income countries. In this categorization we follow the World Bank 2005 
                                                 
30 See Kerner (2009). 21 
 
classification, instead of the most recent 2009 classification, to extend consistently 
earlier empirical work by the author. 
The sample period was plannedinitially to be 1985–2008 and to cover 13 MENA 
countries: Algeria, Egypt,Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia,in addition to the six 
oil-rich GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.31 
However due to missing observations on trade openness, defined as the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, for Libya and Qatar, these two countries 
were excluded.32Also observations on trade openness for 2008 are missing for 
Bahrain, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. Thus the sample period has been 
shortened to 1991–2007.33 
5.2  Empirical issues and estimation methodology 
The lack of bilateral data on FDI flows has constituted an empirical challenge for this 
study. Unlike previous studies which adopt gravity models and use bilateral FDI 
flows, this study uses FDI flows at the aggregate level. This limitation has affected the 
consequent modelling approach of the BITs entered into force and likely results in an 
upward coefficient bias of BIT (entered into force as opposed to signed), if there are 
positive FDI flows from contracting partner (home) countries with which there are no 
treaties entered into force.34 
The adopted modelling approach implies that BITs are de facto assumed to be equal 
in PRP strength. While this assumption can be argued against, it is not totally 
unrealistic from a legal perspective given the tendency to adopt ‘standardized’ clauses 
in many treaties. In addition there is not much variation in PRP strength among 
countries with similar income levels, and therefore we do not expect to have treaties 
with remarkable differences in the degree of PRP to be achieved. 
In estimating the empirical model, there are a number of empirical issues that we need 
to consider. These are heterogeneity, endogeneity, and autocorrelation. We will 
discuss each issue in turn. 
5.2.1 Heterogeneity 
The performance of MENA countries with respect to FDI inflows, domestic 
institutional functions, and BITs is heterogeneous,as discussed in Section 3, and 
therefore is likely to generate heteroskedasticity in the error term. Thus we split the 
                                                 
31 Lebanon is excluded from the sample due to the civil war and political unrest, which have plagued 
the country until recently, and the absence of natural resources, an important explanatory variable 
in the empirical model.  
32 Missing observations on trade openness for Libya are for the periods 1985-90 and 2004-08. For 
Qatar, missing observations are for the period 1985-94 and in 2008. 
33 Observations on labour force for Kuwait are missing for the period 1993-95 and have been 
interpolated. We applied compounded annual growth rates obtained for the period 1992-96 to the 
missing period. 
34 This, however, would underestimate the influence of signed treaties, as Neumayer and Spess (2005) 
argue. 22 
 
sample into GCC and non-GCC countries, and conducted a likelihood ratio (LR) test 
for heterogeneity. The p-values of the LR test for all model specifications were 
significant at the 1 per cent level indicating a failure to accept the null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic error term.35 Therefore we decided first to adopt a feasible generalized 
least squares estimation (FGLS) approach. Appendix B provides the LR test statistics 
for the full sample and the two sub-samples for the different model specifications. 
5.2.2 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity in the model results from simultaneity and variable omission associated 
with unobservable country effects. Simultaneity arises from the reverse causality 
between FDI inflows on the one hand and BITs entered into force and domestic 
institutional functions on the other.36 While BITsentered into forcemay influence FDI 
inflows, FDI inflows may also encourage FDI home country governments to contract 
investment treaties to protect the property rights of their investors abroad. 
Simultaneity also arises from the reverse causality between FDI inflows and the 
different domestic institutional functions, especially when foreign investors are major 
multinational corporations, such as those operating in mining and petro-chemicalsand 
financial and telecommunications services in the MENA region. 
Variable omission can be associated with unobservable country-specific effects, such 
as the degree of strength of foreign relationships a GCC country has with the rest of 
the world, including countries with which BITs are contracted. It can also be 
associated with omitted variables related to ownership advantages that foreign 
corporations have. This in turn results in correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term and in biased OLS estimates. 
To overcome the endogeneity issue, we use lagged explanatory variables, similar to 
Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006). Adopting an 
instrumental variables estimation methodology and dynamic panel regression are 
other approaches to the endogeneity problem. However with the dearth of data on 
MENA countries, the selection of instruments becomes a very difficult and an ad hoc 
exercise. 
5.2.3 Autocorrelation 
For autocorrelation, we conducted the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic errors of a linear paneldata model, as suggested by Wooldridge 
(2002).37 The null hypothesis of no serial correlation was rejected only at the 1 per 
cent significance level for the full sample and at the 5 per cent levels for the sub-
samples suggesting thepresence of autocorrelation.Appendix B provides the test 
                                                 
35  By different model specifications, we mean the empirical model with different domestic 
institutional functions.  
36 See Mina (2009) on the potential endogeneity between FDI, domestic institutions and BITs in the 
GCC countries. 
37 Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation the residuals from the regression of the first-
differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5, implying that the coefficient on the 
lagged residuals in a regression of the lagged residuals on the current residuals should be -0.5. 23 
 
statistics for the full sample and the two sub-samples for the different model 
specifications. Accordingly we account for autocorrelation, both across and within 
panels, in regressions.  
6 Empirical  results 
The iterative FGLS estimates for non-GCC and GCC countries sub-samples (with and 
without the interaction term BITINSTITFN) are provided in Tables 9A and 9B, 
respectively. Estimates are provided after accounting for heteroskedasticity and 
within- and cross-panel correlations.Each column corresponds to an institutional 
function. 
6.1  Empirical results with no model interaction term 
The influence of BITs is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in 
all specifications for GCC countries and statistically insignificant in nearly all 
specifications for non-GCC countries, in Tables 9A-1 and 9B-1. For example, in 
column 1 of Table 9B-1, BIT coefficient suggests that for a GCC country a treaty 
entered into force with an OECD country increases FDI flows on average by 29.6 per 
cent (holding other explanatory variables constant). 
Domestic institutional functions do not have a statistically significant influence in 
both sub-samples in almost all specifications. Only in GCC countries, the influence of 
investment expropriation risk is positive, but marginally significant.  
The lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications for all three tables suggesting persistence in FDI flows to MENA 
countries. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of persistence is much 
higher in GCC than in non-GCC countries. In the first specification of Table 9B-1 for 
example, an increase in FDI flows to GCC countries in the previous year by 1 per cent 
increases FDI flows in the current year by about 0.4 per cent compared to about 0.25 
per cent in non-GCC countries. 
Location factors are important determinants of FDI flows to MENA countries. In 
GCC countries oil prices and labour force attract FDI flows, while oil production and 
inflation discourage them. Trade openness on the other hand has a positive though 
statistically insignificant influence. In non-GCC countries labour force and trade 
openness play a positive and statistically significant role in attracting FDI flows. 
Similar to GCC countries, oil production has a negative, but marginally significant 
influence, while oil price has no statistically significant influence unlike GCC 
countries. 
What is common to both GCC and non-GCC countries is the positive influence that 
labour force exerts on FDI flows. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of 
labour force influence is 60 per cent to 100 per cent higher in GCC countries than in 
non-GCC countries.  
The association between world business cycle and FDI flows differ in the two country 
groups. FDI seems to flow pro-cyclically to non-GCC countries, i.e. with the world 24 
 
business cycle, but counter-cyclically to GCC countries. FDI outflows from GCC 
countries during world business cycle can be one possible interpretation for this 
result. 
6.2  Empirical results with model interaction term 
Including interaction term into the regressions has not changed the estimated 
influence of human and natural resource endowments, trade openness, 
macroeconomic stability, and world business cycle. However, the estimated influence 
has changed slightly for domestic institutional functions and BITs. Results show that 
in GCC countries the statistical significance of BIT coefficient drops from 1 per cent 
level in all specifications to at least 5 per cent level in only two specifications 
containing corruption and government stability (Table 9B-2). In the specification 
containing corruption, the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level and is negative. This suggests that entry into force of a BIT 
reduces FDI flows when the country has less corruption. Therefore, less corruption 
and BITs tend to be substitutes in GCC countries. The same applies for government 
stability. 
In non-GCC countries, the inclusion of the interaction term has changed the influence 
of domestic institutional function and BITs. Of the five model specifications, the 
specifications containing investment profile or risk of investment expropriation and 
government stability are worth discussing. The magnitude and statistical significance 
of INSTITFN in the investment profile specification has increased significantly, while 
its sign in the government stability specification has turned positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. An improvement in investment expropriation risk 
and in government stability by 1 per cent increases FDI flows by about 1.5 per cent 
and 3 per cent, respectively. Also BIT coefficient has turned positive, and its 
magnitude and statistical significance increased to the 1 per cent level. The coefficient 
of BITINSTITFN is negative, suggesting that FDI flows less to countries with better 
risk of investment expropriation and government stability, suggesting these BITs and 
these two functions are substitutes in the non-GCC MENA countries. 
6.3 Hypothesis  testing 
With the above results in place, we can now turn to discuss hypothesis testing, as 
specified in Section 4.2.For the first hypothesis of no influence of domestic 
institutional functions, it is clear that we fail to reject the null hypothesis in most 
model specifications, whether we include an interaction term or not, and for both 
GCC and non-GCC countries. In the case of non-GCC countries, the risk of 
investment expropriation has a positive influence on FDI flows, whether we include 
an interaction term or not, suggesting the importance of this institutional function for 
attracting FDI flows. 
Examining the influence of BITs alone, which is the main component for 
conceptualizing the second best, the influence is different in GCC and non-GCC 
countries. In non-GCC countries, such influence is hardly significant both in 
economic and statistical size. In the only specification where it is statistically 
significant, an increase in the number of treaties by 1 increases FDI flows by about 25 
 
0.4 per cent. In GCC countries, BIT coefficient is significant economically and 
statistically and suggests that its influence on FDI flows is about 30 per cent.  
For the second hypothesis of no influence of domestic institutional functions and 
BITs, as well as the interaction between them, we can see from Tables 9A-2 and 9B-2 
that the joint influence is positive in specifications containing investment 
expropriation risk and government stability in the case of non-GCC countries, and 
corruption in the case of GCC countries. 
 
7 Robustness  checks 
As mentioned in the empirical model sub-section (4.1), we normalize FDI flows by 
population size to account for differences in economy size. Results are reported in 
Tables 9C and 9D for non-GCC and GCC countries, respectively. 
For non-GCC countries, as Tables 9C-1 and 9C-2 show, the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable are statistically significant in almost all specifications and of 
comparable magnitude to those in Tables 9A-1 and 9A-2. In Table 9C-2, the 
coefficients of domestic institutional functions, BITs, and the interaction term are 
significant in specifications 1 and 5 including risk of investment expropriation and 
government stability, similar to those in Table 9A-2. LABOUR coefficients drop to 
less than half of those in Table 9A-2 but still positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. 
For GCC countries, as Tables 9D-1 and 9D-2 show, the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable are statistically significant in all specifications and of comparable 
magnitude to those in Tables 9B-1 and 9B-2. The coefficients of other explanatory 
variables are also similar in magnitude and statistical significance.As in the case for 
non-GCC countries, LABOUR coefficients for GCC countries drop but not as much.  
8 Concluding  remarks 
This research has explored the issue of how MENA countries can approach 
institutional reforms aiming at attracting FDI flows to the region. Should MENA 
countries in strengthening PRP focus on reforming domestic institutional functions 
alone—a first best approach—or should they reform domestic institutional   
functions together and contracting BITs at the same time? 
This paper helps us draw a number of conclusions. First, conceptually the paper helps 
us conceive a second best approach to PRP institutional reforms. A second best 
approach to institutional reform should consider not only domestic institutional 
functions  and BITs, but also the interactionbetween them.Second, from a policy-
making perspective, policy makers ought not to think of MENA countries as one 
group of homogenous countries. Not only do MENA countries have different 
endowments, but they also differ in their institutional functions performance. Also 
evidence reveals that in non-GCC MENA countries improvement in the risk of 26 
 
investment expropriation and government stability are particularly influential 
domestic institutional functions for FDI flows, while in GCC countries corruption 
matters. Third, natural and human resource endowments matter to FDI flows to 
MENA countries. 
Finally in answering the title question of whether there is one best that fits all MENA 
countries, the evidence seems to give a nod. Second best fits all MENA countries, but 
we need to be specific about the relevant domestic institutional functions in order to 
attract more FDI to either group of countries. 
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Appendix A 
Variables, definitions, and data sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
FDIFLOWS  FDI flows in millions of USUS$ (log)   UNCTAD’s FDI online database. 
BIT  Total number of BITs entered into force.  Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD’s 
BITs online database. 
INSTITFN  Domestic PRP institutional functions. 
These are (a)investment profile, (b) 
corruption, c) law and order, and (d) 
bureaucracy quality (log). 
ICRG political risk index. 
BITINSTITFN  Interaction term between BIT and 
INSTITFN constructed as the product of 
INSTITFN (log form) and BIT. 
 
Author’s calculation. 
OIL  Oil production in thousands of barrels per 
day (log).  
Energy Information Administration 
PRICE  Crude oil price measured by the price of 
Saudi Arabian Light 34 in USUS$/barrel 
(log). 
Energy Information Administration 
LABOUR  Labour force (log).  World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
TRADE  Sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP (log). 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
INFLATION  Inflation rate in percentage (log). Rate is 
calculated based on the consumer price 
index, except for Oman and UAE where it 
is based on GDP deflator. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
WFDIFLOWS  World FDI inflows in millions of USUS$ (in 
log form). 
Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD’s 
BITs online database. 
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Appendix B 







  Heterogeneity 
Investment profile  182.87  51.74  105.01 
Corruption 180.06  50.86  103.94 
Law and order  174.78  48.42  100.5 
Bureaucracy quality  178.19  50.39  98.85 
Government stability  176.03  50.5  94.55 
  Serial correlation 
Investment profile  17.13  11.919  24.89
* 
Corruption 19.16  11.757  8.59 
Law and order  19.41  13.282  9.13 
Bureaucracy quality  19.38  15.32  8.11 
Government stability  19.61  12.946  8.26 
Notes: Heterogeneity likelihood ratio (chi-squared) test statistics are significant at the 1% level. Serial 
correlation (F) test statistics are significant at the 1% level for the full sample, and 5% level for the sub-
samples; an asteriskindicatessignificance at the 1% level for the sub-samples. 
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Table 1: Domestic institutional functions in MENA and OECD countries (1990–2008) 
(Period average) 
Function MENA  GCC  Non-GCC  OECD  MENA-OECD 
Ratio 
PRP           
Investment profile  7.88  8.65  7.23  9.09  0.867 
Corruption 2.61  2.42  2.77  4.77  0.547 
Law and order  4.31  4.69  4.0  5.57  0.774 
Bureaucracy quality  1.97  2.18  1.79  3.78  0.521 
          
Political          
Government stability  9. 23  9.26  9.2  8.25  1.119 
Ethnic tensions  4.62  4.69  4.56  4.97  0.930 
Internal conflict  9.49  9.94  9.11  11.10  0.855 
External conflict  9.98  10.01  9.96  11.04  0.904 
Military in politics  3.71  4.5  3.03  5.77  0.643 
Religion in politics  3.54  3.57  3.51  5.62  0.630 
Democratic 
accountability 
2.29 1.89  2.64  5.73  0.400 
Notes: The list of OECD countries is based on the World Bank’s 2005 income classification. It comprises 
24 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The MENA countries are 13 and comprise 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
and the UAE. The GCC countries are 6 and comprise Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UAE. 
Source: ICRG data. 
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Table 2: Period averages for MENA countries (1985–2008) 
Country  FDI  IP  C  L&O  BQ GS ET IC  EC MP RP DA 
Algeria  540.5  6.9 2.7 2.3 1.7 8.3 3.2 6.4 10.2  1.3 2  3 
Egypt  2,296.10  6.3 2.2 3.4 2  8.5 4.9 7.9 9.6 2.7 2.4 3.1 
Jordan  513.5  7.2 3.3 3.6 2.1 8.6 4.4 8.6 9.3 4.3 3.1 3.6 
Libya  516  6.9 3  3.4 1.2 8.1 4.1 8.7 8.5 2.4 3.7 1.5 
Morocc
o 
921.7  7.3 2.9 4.4 2.1 9.1 4.4 8.6 9.2 3.6 3.7 3 
Syria  291.8  5.4 2.7 4  1.2 9.1 4.8 9.7 7.9 1.9 4.2 1.5 
Tunisia  686.5  7.2 2.7 4  2  8.8 5  9.9 9.7 3.8 4.4 2.5 
Total  823.7  6.7 2.8 3.6 1.8 8.6 4.4 8.6 9.2 2.9 3.3 2.6 
              
Bahrain  611.4  8.1 2.9 4.8 2.5 8.3 3.9 8.3 9.9 3.9 3.6 2.2 
Kuwait  37.6  8  2.7 4.3 1.9 8  4.1 8.9 8.6 4.6 2.7 2.6 
Oman  461.7  8.5 2.8 4.5 2.2 9  4.6 9.8 9.9 4  4.1 1.8 
Qatar  915.8  8  2.1 4.6 1.7 8.7 5.3 9.6 8.7 4.1 3.7 1.9 
Saudi 
Arabia 
4,108.50  8.2 2.1 4.6 2.3 8.5 4.5 9  9  4.5 2.6 1 
UAE  2,863.20  8.3 2.3 3.7 2.5 8.3 3.6 9.4 9.3 4.7 3.4 2 
Total  1,499.70  8.2 2.5 4.4 2.2 8.5 4.3 9.1 9.2 4.3 3.4 1.9 
Notes: FDI (FDI inflows in USUS$ million), IP (investment profile), C (corruption), L&O (law and order), BQ (bureaucratic quality), GS (government stability), ET (ethnic 
tensions), IC (internal conflict), EC (external conflict), MP (military in politics), RP (religion in politics), and DA (democratic accountability). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD and ICRG data. 
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Table 3: Total BITs entered into force (June 2008) 
(by income level of contracting partner) 















MENA  300  100 18  45  104 32 
         
Algeria  15  6 1 2 4 2 
Egypt 64  12 7  12 21 12 
Jordan  28  10  1 6 9 2 
Libya  8  3 0 0 5 0 
Morocco  35  13 4  7  10 1 
Syria  20  5 3 2 8 2 
Tunisia  25  11  1 5 7 1 
Total  195  60 17 34 64 20 
         
GCC         
Bahrain  10  2 0 0 7 0 
Kuwait  33  10 1  7  10 5 
Oman  19  9 0 0 6 4 
Qatar  11  5 0 0 5 1 
Saudi  Arabia  8  5 0 0 3 0 
UAE 24  9 0 4 9 2 
Total  105  40 1  11 40 12 
Notes: Using World Bank’s 2005 income classification of countries. 
Source: UNCTAD (1998). 
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Table 4: FDI flows in MENA countries (1985–2008) 
(Period average in US$million) 
Country/region Value 



















MENA total  1,135.70 
Source: UNCTAD (1998). 
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Table 5: Correlation between FDI inflows, institutional functions, 
and BITs (1990–2008) 
  All Non-
GCC 
GCC  
PRP     
Investment  profile  0.373b 0.498b 0.392b 
Corruption -0.260  -0.383b  -0.212b 
Law and order  0.149b  0.267b  0.170 
Bureaucratic quality  0.080  0.240b  0.059 
      
Political       
Government  stability  0.426b 0.562b 0.325b 
Ethnic tensions  0.216b  0.124  0.320b 
Internal conflict  0.125  0.233b  0.092 
External conflict  0.082  -0.008  0.168 
Military in religion  0.124  0.410b  -0.054 
Religion  in  politics  0.197b 0.255b 0.236b 
Democratic  accountability  -0.118 -0.088 -0.238b 
     
BITs     
All  0.313b 0.504b 0.039 
OECD  0.337b 0.544b 0.113 
High-income  non-OECD  0.243b 0.386b -0.225b 
Upper  middle-income  0.238b 0.489b -0.149 
Lower  middle-income  0.267b 0.411b 0.077 
Low-income  0.183b 0.348b -0.082 
Notes: With the exception of BITs, variables are in log forms. b significant at 5% level. Sample excludes 
Lebanon, Libya, and Qatar. 
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Table 6: Correlation between institutional functions and BITs 
(1990–2008) 
 IP  L&O  C  BQ  GS 
All  0.323b 0.179b -0.387b  0.021  0.419b 
OECD 0.456b  0.259b  -0.303b  0.124  0.496b 
High-income non-
OECD 
0.044 0.093 -0.325b -0.136b  0.240b 
Upper middle-income  0.234b  0.140b  -0.274b  0.056  0.329b 
Lower middle-income  0.337b  0.190b  -0.421b  0.002  0.425b 
Low-income 0.138b  0.024  -0.359b  -0.054  0.248b 
        
Non-GCC        
All 0.387b  0.292b  -0.513b  0.139  0.417b 
OECD  0.548b 0.401b -0.425b  0.253b 0.463b 
High-income non-
OECD 
0.198b 0.227b -0.494b  -0.002  0.324b 
Upper  middle-income  0.423b 0.321b -0.395b  0.202b 0.414b 
Lower middle-income  0.353b  0.268b  -0.486b  0.067  0.404b 
Low-income  0.133 0.050 -0.536b 0.069 0.236b 
        
GCC        
All  0.502b  0.161 -0.208b 0.042 0.499b 
OECD  0.494b  0.151 -0.149  0.098 0.555b 
High-income non-
OECD 
0.030 0.245b  0.065  -0.162  0.101 
Upper  middle-income  0.202 0.009 -0.178  0.140 0.216b 
Lower  middle-income  0.517b  0.171 -0.359b 0.038 0.515b 
Low-income 0.339b  0.164  0.065  -0.195  0.308b 
Notes: With the exception of BITs, variables are in log forms. b significant at 5% level. Sample excludes 
Lebanon, Libya, and Qatar. 
Source: Correlation coefficients obtained using STATA 9.0. 
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Table 7: Natural and human resource endowments in MENA region 
Natural resources  Human resources 
Oil  Natural gas  Population size 









Country Size  in 
million 
(2007) 
Saudi  Arabia  266.7  Qatar 905.3 Egypt 75.5 
Kuwait 104.0  UAE  214.4  Algeria  33.9 
UAE 97.8  Algeria  159 Morocco  30.9 
Libya 43.7  Egypt  58.5 Saudi 
Arabia 
24.2 
Qatar 15.2  Kuwait  56.0  Syria 19.9 
Algeria 12.2 Libya  50.1  Tunisia  10.2 
Oman 5.5  Oman 30.0  Libya 6.2 
Egypt 3.7 Syria 8.5  Jordan  5.7 
Syria 2.5  Bahrain  3.3  UAE 4.4 
Tunisia 0.4  Tunisia 2.3  Kuwait 2.7 
Bahrain 0.1  Jordan  0.2  Oman  2.6 
Jordan 0.0  Morocco  0.1  Qatar  0.8 
Morocco 0.0  Saudi 
Arabia 
0.0 Bahrain  0.8 
Notes: Countries are listed by resource endowments rank. Oil and natural gas reserves data are obtained 
from the Energy Information Administration website. Population size data are obtained from the United 
Nations Common Database. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
FDIFLOWS 187  1,246.82  3,106.91  (985.34)  24,318.40 
INSTITFN          
Investment profile  187  7.92  2.18  1.25  11.50 
Corruption 187  2.63  0.71  1.50  4.00 
Law and order  187  4.37  1.00  1.42  6.00 
Bureaucracy quality  187  2.03  0.48  0.58  3.00 
Government stability  187  9.34  1.55  4.25  11.21 
BIT 187  4.58  3.51  -  12.00 
OIL 187  1,641.28  2,656.53  (1.46)  11,096.31 
PRICE 187  24.02  12.13  10.03  55.94 
LABOUR 187  5,635,635.00  6,177,569.00  228,519.20  25,800,000.00 
TRADE 184  91.35  35.57  38.36  181.12 
INFLATION 187  4.38 6.35 (13.35)  31.67 
WFDIFLOWS 187  726,345.70  498,401.40  155,685.60  1,978,838.00 
Variables (log) 
FDIFLOWS 187  5.24  3.03 (6.89)  10.10 
INSTITFN          
Investment profile  187  2.03  0.31  0.22  2.44 
Corruption 187  0.93 0.27  0.41  1.39 
Law and order  187  1.44  0.28  0.35  1.79 
Bureaucracy quality  187  0.68  0.27  (0.54)  1.10 
Government stability  187  2.22  0.19  1.45  2.42 
OIL 187  5.55  2.80  (2.79)  9.31 
PRICE 187  3.08  0.44  2.31  4.02 
LABOUR 187  14.88  1.25  12.34  17.06 
TRADE 184  4.44  0.38  3.65  5.20 
INFLATION 187  1.01  1.25 (3.20)  3.46 
WFDIFLOWS 187  13.24  0.74  11.96  14.50 
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Table 9A-1: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to non-GCC Countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
         
FDIFLOWS(-1)  0.232a 0.270a 0.294a 0.171b 0.114 
  (0.081) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.088) 
INSTITFN  0.534c  0.128 0.277 -0.412  -0.106 
  (0.306) (0.285) (0.267) (0.300) (0.416) 
BIT -0.014  -0.001  0.001  -0.012  0.037c 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
OIL -0.026  -0.053c  -0.045  -0.052  -0.079a 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030) 
PRICE  0.201 0.144 0.145 0.164 0.191 
  (0.199) (0.215) (0.229) (0.212) (0.204) 
LABOUR  1.591a 1.501a 1.495a 1.694a 1.399a 
  (0.178) (0.174) (0.177) (0.191) (0.191) 
TRADE  2.984a 2.681a 2.819a 2.984a 2.180a 
  (0.440) (0.438) (0.415) (0.442) (0.518) 
INFLATION 0.073  0.159c 0.199b 0.163b 0.065 
  (0.082) (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) 
WFDIFLOWS 0.169  0.391a 0.382b 0.388a 0.409a 
  (0.138) (0.132) (0.153) (0.137) (0.155) 
Constant  -36.495a -36.001a -36.901a -39.249a -31.399a 
  (4.327) (4.349) (4.495) (4.562) (4.603) 
       
Observations  102 102 102 102 102 
Number  of  groups  6 6 6 6 6 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
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Table 9A-2: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to non-GCC Countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows –interaction term 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
                 
FDIFLOWS(-1)  0.221a 0.196b 0.246a 0.133c 0.258a 
  (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) 
INSTITFN  1.460a  -0.209 -0.094 -0.571 3.115a 
  (0.345) (0.329) (0.295) (0.386) (0.808) 
BIT  0.401a -0.074b  -0.041 -0.105 1.980a 
  (0.105) (0.035) (0.124) (0.128) (0.456) 
BITINSTITFN  -0.207a 0.104b  0.033 0.148 -0.846a 
  (0.054) (0.046) (0.088) (0.170) (0.197) 
OIL  -0.048c  -0.010 -0.049 -0.054 -0.085a 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) 
PRICE  0.352c  0.091 0.139 0.218 0.185 
  (0.196) (0.215) (0.215) (0.210) (0.239) 
LABOUR  1.513a 1.716a 1.444a 1.597a 1.303a 
  (0.167) (0.177) (0.186) (0.187) (0.164) 
TRADE  2.849a 3.211a 2.592a 2.690a 2.266a 
  (0.409) (0.452) (0.461) (0.453) (0.456) 
INFLATION 0.075  0.099  0.134  0.156c 0.221a 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.080) 
WFDIFLOWS  0.257c 0.303b 0.340b 0.377a 0.478a 
  (0.132) (0.143) (0.158) (0.140) (0.165) 
Constant  -37.932a -39.716a -33.659a -36.145a -39.453a 
  (4.251) (4.232) (4.760) (4.400) (4.348) 
       
Observations  102 102 102 102 102 
Number  ofgroups 6 6 6 6 6 
       
H0: β2=0  17.93a  - - - 14.87a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0   20.32a  - - - 18.82a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0; β4=0   20.59a  - - - 20.03a 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Standard errors 
in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and within 
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Table 9B-1: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
         
FDIFLOWS(-1)  0.366a 0.409a 0.401a 0.387a 0.378a 
  (0.085) (0.081) (0.084) (0.080) (0.079) 
INSTITFN  0.507 0.224 0.087 -0.100  -0.591 
  (0.658) (1.781) (0.912) (0.713) (0.969) 
BIT  0.296a 0.298a 0.316a 0.291a 0.295a 
  (0.091) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) 
OIL  -1.603a -1.623a -1.542a -1.694a -1.767a 
  (0.524) (0.524) (0.517) (0.513) (0.513) 
PRICE  1.143b 1.356a 1.236a 1.429a 1.505a 
  (0.445) (0.441) (0.442) (0.436) (0.422) 
LABOUR  2.695a 2.728a 2.613a 2.759a 2.828a 
  (0.733) (0.858) (0.721) (0.695) (0.695) 
TRADE  -0.143 -0.448 -0.178 -0.566 -0.726 
  (0.956) (0.916) (0.925) (0.952) (0.946) 
INFLATION  -0.133c -0.174b -0.169b -0.174b -0.186b 
  (0.078) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
WFDIFLOWS  -0.735b -0.712b -0.710b -0.731b -0.652c 
  (0.317) (0.297) (0.337) (0.320) (0.334) 
Constant  -18.377a -17.687c -17.446a -16.624a -16.345a 
 (6.065)  (10.328)  (6.295)  (6.101)  (5.672) 
       
Observations  85 85 85 85 85 
Number  of  groups  5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
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Table 9B-2: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI Inflows—interaction term 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
         
FDIFLOWS(-1)  0.353a 0.301a 0.350a 0.353a 0.326a 
  (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.081) (0.082) 
INSTITFN -0.092  3.676c  0.836 -0.773  0.966 
  (0.829) (2.053) (1.012) (1.037) (0.985) 
BIT -0.017  1.086a 2.278c 0.064  1.499b 
  (0.492) (0.286) (1.228) (0.256) (0.743) 
BITINSTITFN 0.154  -0.903a  -1.240 0.283  -0.523c 
  (0.216) (0.288) (0.756) (0.331) (0.317) 
OIL  -1.537a -1.540a -1.787a -1.803a -1.544a 
  (0.526) (0.551) (0.524) (0.518) (0.504) 
PRICE  1.077b 1.382a 1.609a 1.664a 1.351a 
  (0.424) (0.442) (0.458) (0.444) (0.419) 
LABOUR  2.597a 2.666a 2.845a 2.856a 2.553a 
  (0.755) (0.884) (0.724) (0.704) (0.707) 
TRADE  0.000  -1.157 -0.949 -0.830 -0.222 
  (0.980) (0.918) (0.919) (0.950) (0.947) 
INFLATION  -0.137c  -0.022  -0.144b -0.177b -0.132c 
  (0.078) (0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.068) 
WFDIFLOWS  -0.711b -0.655b -0.741b -0.760b -0.646c 
  (0.316) (0.314) (0.363) (0.341) (0.345) 
Constant  -16.993b -17.515c -17.156a -15.616a -19.153a 
  (6.825) (10.312)  (5.823) (6.028) (6.446) 
       
Observations  85 85 85 85 85 
Number  of  groups  5 5 5 5 5 
       
H0: β2=0  - - - - 3.2a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0    - - - - 14.41a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0; β4=0    - - - - 17.89a 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
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Table 9C-1: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to non-GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows per capita 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
       
FDIFLOWSCAPITA(-1)  0.258a 0.312a 0.331a 0.194b 0.149c 
  -0.082  -0.079  -0.08 -0.08 -0.087 
INSTITFN  0.571b  0.1 0.128  -0.122  -0.019 
  -0.29  -0.284 -0.252 -0.312 -0.402 
BIT  -0.005  0.009 0.012 0.004 0.031c 
  -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 
OIL -0.033  -0.061b -0.058b -0.054c -0.091a 
  -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 -0.031 -0.027 
PRICE  0.206 0.141 0.134 0.206 0.24 
  -0.187 -0.204 -0.218 -0.198 -0.195 
LABOUR  0.773a 0.715a 0.711a 0.681a 0.548a 
  -0.129 -0.129 -0.131 -0.154 -0.152 
TRADE  2.831a 2.522a 2.599a 2.644a 2.130a 
  -0.443 -0.441 -0.426 -0.461 -0.499 
INFLATION 0.049  0.137  0.167b 0.154c 0.056 
  -0.082 -0.084 -0.082 -0.085 -0.088 
WFDIFLOWS 0.127  0.355a 0.339b 0.354a 0.344b 
  -0.131 -0.127 -0.147 -0.129 -0.143 
Constant  -24.901a -24.783a -25.030a -24.319a -19.986a 
  -3.765 -3.823 -3.953 -4.169 -4.078 
       
Observations  102 102 102 102 102 
Number  of  groups  6 6 6 6 6 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
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Table 9C-2: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to non-GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows per capita–interaction term 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
       
FDIFLOWSCAPITA(-1)  0.290a 0.237a 0.299a 0.111  0.276a 
  -0.074 -0.082 -0.08  -0.078 -0.078 
INSTITFN  1.566a  -0.215 -0.061 -0.442 3.327a 
  -0.327 -0.332 -0.276 -0.41  -0.81 
BIT  0.439a -0.058c  -0.008 -0.223 1.977a 
  -0.097 -0.035 -0.116 -0.141 -0.44 
BITINSTITFN  -0.221a 0.090b  0.015  0.323c -0.844a 
  -0.05  -0.044 -0.082 -0.191 -0.19 
OIL  -0.060b  -0.028  -0.058b  -0.045  -0.092a 
  -0.025 -0.027 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 
PRICE  0.308c  0.112 0.138 0.360c  0.255 
  -0.187 -0.205 -0.208 -0.189 -0.229 
LABOUR  0.688a 0.851a 0.656a 0.438a 0.527a 
  -0.115 -0.129 -0.139 -0.147 -0.132 
TRADE  2.766a 2.977a 2.475a 2.165a 2.028a 
  -0.392 -0.456 -0.45  -0.445 -0.443 
INFLATION 0.066  0.091  0.128  0.147c 0.233a 
  -0.08  -0.081 -0.084 -0.084 -0.082 
WFDIFLOWS 0.209  0.277b 0.319b 0.380a 0.418a 
  -0.127 -0.132 -0.148 -0.125 -0.154 
Constant  -26.600a -27.329a -22.961a -18.703a -28.436a 
  -3.548 -3.747 -4.179 -3.869 -3.981 
       
Observations  102 102 102 102 102 
Number of groups  6  6  6  6  6 
       
H0: β2=0  22.97a  - - - 16.89a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0   26.65a  - - - 20.38a 
H0: β2=0; β3=0; β4=0   27.76a  - - - 21.57a 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
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Table 9D-1: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows per capita 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
       
FDIFLOWSCAPITA(-1)  0.326a 0.373a 0.358a 0.362a 0.352a 
  (0.086) (0.083) (0.087) (0.082) (0.082) 
INSTITFN  0.636 0.030 0.221 0.014 -0.478 
  (0.665) (1.816) (0.918) (0.766) (0.973) 
BIT  0.301a 0.320a 0.331a 0.305a 0.314a 
  (0.095) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085) 
OIL  -1.572a -1.580a -1.556a -1.637a -1.700a 
  (0.517) (0.520) (0.511) (0.512) (0.516) 
PRICE  0.958b 1.103a 1.069b 1.184a 1.231a 
  (0.438) (0.424) (0.434) (0.423) (0.413) 
LABOUR  2.112a 2.151b 2.128a 2.187a 2.243a 
  (0.714) (0.835) (0.697) (0.682) (0.688) 
TRADE  0.550 0.292 0.465 0.165 0.067 
  (0.967) (0.975) (0.961) (0.974) (0.975) 
INFLATION -0.115  -0.158b -0.152b -0.156b -0.168b 
  (0.081) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) 
WFDIFLOWS  -0.685b -0.658b -0.675b -0.668b -0.618c 
  (0.317) (0.293) (0.333) (0.311) (0.326) 
Constant  -14.601b -13.690  -14.263b -13.224b -12.819b 
 (6.408)  (10.581)  (6.647)  (6.479)  (6.121) 
       
Observations  85 85 85 85 85 
Number  of  groups  5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
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Table 9D-2: Institutional functions, BITs and FDI flows to GCC countries 
Dependent variable: log of FDI inflows per capita—interaction term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IP  C  L&O  BQ  GS 
       
FDIFLOWSCAPITA(-1)  0.310a 0.226a 0.283a 0.313a 0.275a 
  (0.087) (0.085) (0.088) (0.083) (0.084) 
INSTITFN 0.118  3.983b  1.270 -0.988  1.154 
  (0.835) (2.031) (1.064) (1.091) (0.975) 
BIT 0.047  1.301a 2.724b -0.049  1.928b 
  (0.517) (0.297) (1.190) (0.272) (0.794) 
BITINSTITFN 0.126  -1.147a -1.532b 0.433  -0.702b 
  (0.226) (0.299) (0.733) (0.352) (0.341) 
OIL  -1.533a -1.578a -1.877a -1.807a -1.564a 
  (0.518) (0.541) (0.518) (0.521) (0.498) 
PRICE  0.913b 1.361a 1.713a 1.539a 1.168a 
  (0.417) (0.441) (0.473) (0.443) (0.419) 
LABOUR  2.048a 1.921b 2.298a 2.284a 1.971a 
  (0.739) (0.851) (0.700) (0.693) (0.687) 
TRADE  0.659  -1.022 -0.836 -0.309 0.264 
  (0.984) (0.932) (0.941) (0.970) (0.958) 
INFLATION -0.122  0.012  -0.120c -0.159b -0.113 
  (0.081) (0.068) (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) 
WFDIFLOWS  -0.662b -0.575c -0.697c -0.693b -0.545 
  (0.321) (0.322) (0.379) (0.344) (0.342) 
Constant  -13.539c -9.169  -11.450c -10.927c -14.946b 
  (7.134) (10.309)  (5.912) (6.348) (6.787) 
       
Observations  85 85 85 85 85 
Number  of  groups  5 5 5 5 5 
       
H0: β2=0 -  3.85b  - - - 
H0: β2=0; β3=0   -  19.28a  - - - 
H0: β2=0; β3=0; β4=0   -  21.02a  - - - 
Notes: ‘IP’, ‘C’, ‘L&O’, ‘BQ’, and ‘GS’ are investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
and government stability respectively. a,b,c significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Iterative FGLS used in estimation and heteroskedastic error structure with cross and 
within panel autocorrelation accounted for. 
 
 
 
 